Abstract 1
The California High-Speed Rail Authority (CHSRA) adopted a "blended system" at the northern 2 and southern termini of the planned first phase of its high-speed rail line. In this blended 3 operation, the high-speed rail line will share track and other infrastructure with commuter, 4 intercity, and freight rail. However, the lack of common infrastructure among rail modes and the 5 financial and organizational challenges associated with building that common infrastructure and 6 capacity allocation in California present challenges for the implementation of high-speed rail via 7 a blended system in the state. This paper reviews the blended system and discusses the level of 8 cooperation and coordination necessary between host railroads/agencies and the high-speed rail 9 tenant operator. Sharing track comes with challenges for all participating railroad operators and 10 often requires coordination between heterogeneous rail traffic. However, costs can be reduced 11 compared to dedicated track. How blended service is carried out will impact state and local 12 agencies, railroad owners and operators, and customers across the California rail network. 13
INTRODUCTION 1
The underlying motivation for this work is to share the challenges and the vision for the 2 implementation of high-speed rail under shared-use conditions in California. In 2012, as a cost-3 control measure and in response to local opposition in the San Francisco Bay Area, the 4 California High-Speed Rail Authority (CHSRA) adopted a "blended system" at the north and 5 south ends of the planned first phase of its high-speed rail line. In this blended operation, the 6 high-speed rail line will share track and other infrastructure with commuter, intercity, and freight 7 rail on the 50-mile Peninsula Corridor in Northern California and on 50 miles of right-of-way 8 between Burbank, Los Angeles, and Anaheim in Southern California. This paper provides a 9 review of the blended system and discusses the challenges and opportunities associated with the 10 level of cooperation and coordination necessary between host railroads/agencies and the HSR 11 tenant operator. 12
Though the CHSRA has existed since 1996, the concept of a high-speed link connecting 13
San Diego, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Sacramento did not significantly move forward 14 until 2008 . In that year California voters passed Proposition 1A, which allocated $9.95 billion in 15 bond funds for high-speed rail (90% of funds) and local associated rail improvement projects 16 (10% of funds) across the state (1). Federal funds including American Recovery and 17
Reinvestment Act (ARRA) add approximately $2.5 billion to the project (2). According to the 18 latest business plan issued by the CHSRA, the initial operating segment between Merced, 19 California and Burbank, California will cost $31 billion (2). The first phase of the project, 20
between San Francisco and Los Angeles, to be completed by 2028, will cost $68 billion; to this 21 end, the CHSRA is pursuing private investment that will be partially repaid by fare revenues 22 (ibid). 23
The high-speed rail system will share right-of-way and often the same track with four 24 right-of-way owners other than the CHSRA itself. 
FIGURE 1 California Passenger Rail Network 2
This paper takes the view that since the high-speed rail line is operating on these shared 3 corridors, and not in a dedicated right-of-way, California needs to take a "top-down" approach to 4 high-speed rail implementation, asking "what do we want as a state and how do we get there?" 5 rather than a bottom-up approach which asks "how does this part of the system need to work for 6 high-speed rail to be successful?" We will discuss how implementation choices will impact 7 agencies, railroad operators, and customers across the California rail network. 8 9
LITERATURE REVIEW 10
In our literature review, we review papers regarding collaboration between transportation 11 agencies which can lead to cross-modal integration, capacity pricing and allocation on shared rail 12 corridors such as the Northeast Corridor (NEC) and California, and finally specific network 13 planning in California. 14
Collaboration between Transportation Agencies 1
The body of literature discussing collaboration between transportation agencies is 2 limited. Literature regarding how to achieve collaboration is also underdeveloped (3) . Currently, 3 the state of relationships between transportation agencies in California presents challenges for 4 the implementation of high-speed rail in the state. 5 6
Collaboration between agencies is critical for the efficient and effective management of 7 transportation systems. However, as funding concerns and litigation slow the process of 8 implementing high-speed rail in California, the level and effectiveness of future multi-9 jurisdictional and multi-organizational cooperation in the state remains unknown. Meyer et al. 10 define collaboration as a process which "involves understanding the need for collaboration, 11 identifying common goals, putting in place common communication strategies, and using 12 feedback mechanisms that allow for collaboration strategies to be evaluated and modified over 13 time to respond better to changing decision-making demands" (3 In defining collaboration as a process, Meyer et al. outline a detailed, sequential ten-step 24 progression that assesses the quality of the evolution of a collaborative effort at each step with a 25 series of questions that serve to build the foundation necessary to move forward in the process. 26 27
Modal integration at the "last-mile" 28
Effective collaboration between transportation agencies in California directly impacts the 29 quality of service at the point where customers must switch to or from high-speed rail to or from 30 other modes to complete their journeys. Reinhard Clever claims that institutional and regulatory 31 barriers to integration are higher in the United States than in Europe or Asia (4). 32
In his 2013 TRB paper, Clever develops a "Six Stages of Integration" framework (see 33 Figure 2 ) that categorizes existing public transportation systems by their level of modal and 34 agency integration in an effort to optimize California high-speed rail. 35
Integration is important for two reasons, the first being the adverse effect of transfer 36 penalties. The cost a passenger incurs in changing trains substantially reduces the utility of using 37 rail as a transport mode. The second reason integration is important is that ridership falls sharply 38 beyond a 400m radius of a station, a phenomenon Clever refers to as the "quarter mile rule;" and 39 it is based on the willingness of travelers to walk (4). relates to transferring between modes (e.g. HSR and commuter) and temporal integration relates 6 to achieving schedule coordination. 7
In the United States, the most integrated level of transportation planning is inter-modal 8 terminal with agency demarcation lines. Clever gives four reasons explaining why transportation 9 planning has not moved beyond this level: 10  Weak Institutions: Individual transit agencies have the power to demand and obtain 11 approval for their own stub-end terminals and no agency is required to adhere to a 12 common regional fare system; there is no incentive to collaborate and share infrastructure 13 (4). 14  Division of Planning: The division of project planning into professional disciplines 15 dealing separately with capital costs, operating costs, and environmental impacts causes 16 one to lose sight of the system as a whole. 17  Suboptimization: Project optimization is compromised by political decisions. 18  Regulatory Challenges: The prevalence of passive safety measures over active safety 19 measures (e.g. design for accident survivability and crashworthiness as opposed to 20 accident avoidance and positive train control) in North America as regulated by the FRA 21 leads to the need for various waivers to permit high-speed trains to run in the same 22 corridor as other grades of train. Clever also argues that airport-style screening at HSR 23 stations would reduce HSR's ability to "leverage synergies with local and regional 24 transportation, greatly diminishing its potential". 25 1
Capacity Allocation and Pricing on Shared Rail Corridors 2
Sharing track, when done properly, is an attractive option for both passenger rail agencies and 3 freight railroads and increasingly common in the United States. However, sharing track also 4 comes with challenges for all participating railroad operators. Sharing track often requires 5 coordination between non-homogenous rail traffic. Rail capacity is not a fixed quantity; it 6 depends on how the infrastructure is used. A rail line can accommodate much more 7 homogenous traffic (same speed and stopping patterns) than a rail line with heterogeneous 8 traffic. 9 10
The National Cooperative High Research Program Report 773 describes the current 11 method of adding service to shared rail corridors: "On corridors they own, freight carriers fully 12 control the technical assessment of the operations for proposed and existing shared-use territories 13 even when the passenger rail sponsor underwrites the cost of such analysis" (5). Freight 14 railroads operate national systems and are often concerned about "network impacts" that extend 15 beyond the reach of passenger rail service on a shared corridor. Sometimes the cost of lost 16 flexibility for freight railroad hosts is greater than the track access fees paid by the commuter rail 17 guest on the line. 18 19
In her dissertation, Maite Pena-Alcaraz notes how lack of capacity planning has made 20 modification of Northeast Corridor services an extremely difficult exercise (6) . On the Northeast 21
Corridor, there are multiple operators and right-of-way owners, not unlike California. However, 22 long-standing bilateral agreements means that some guest railroads are paying access charges 23 that do not reflect the cost of maintaining infrastructure. Also, these bilateral agreements make it 24 difficult to make service adjustments since train timetables are negotiated on a local level rather 25 than on a corridor-or system-wide basis. 26 27
California Rail Network Service Planning 28 29
In the spirit of the blended system (in which high-speed rail coexists with conventional 30 services), Ulrich Leister applies what he describes as a "Swiss Approach" to high-speed rail in 31
California by emphasizing a lean construction approach that features a high-speed "trunk" in the 32 middle of the state connecting to major transfer stations that serve the metropolitan areas of San 33
Francisco and Los Angeles (7). Leister proposes an approach that moderately increases travel 34 time between California's major metropolitan areas, but also (according to Leister' HSR to act as a commuter service at those major metropolitan areas (9) . He suggests that the 7 low cost of rolling stock relative to the total cost of the infrastructure means that sharing rolling 8 stock for intercity and commuter service is "essential for efficient rail transportation." Kasuya 9 performs a case study of Metrolink's Antelope Commuter Rail Line in the Los Angeles basin 10 and concludes that for little additional cost, the HSR operator can increase profits by acting as a 11 commuter service and commuters can benefit up to a 50% travel time-savings. 12 13
As far as research regarding the current plan for the blended system, the authors have not 14 been able to find any further academic work. LTK Consulting produced a short feasibility study 15 of the blended system in 2012 and concluded that the system is in fact feasible; however, we 16 contend that the report did not fully explore the implications of the blended system that we will 17 explore later in this paper. 18 19
In this section, we examine the specific challenges facing each agency and the infrastructure that 22 they own and will share with California HSR. partially funded by the CHSRA--will allow trains to accelerate and decelerate faster than the 16 current diesel fleet; this will enable Caltrain to serve more stations with the same commute time. 17
Per the environmental impact report and the authors' calculations, service to local (non-Baby 18
Bullet) stations will increase 50% while Baby Bullet stations will see increases of 33% (10). By 19 reducing last-mile connections, this service plan should relieve some of Caltrain's bicycle 20 crowding challenges, but could also drive overall ridership demand. Caltrain has the highest on-21 board bicycle usage of any transit agency in the United States; 83% of the bicyclists use a Baby 22
Bullet stop as part of their commute (10). This has led to Caltrain trading seats for bike capacity 23 to ameliorate some of the "bumping" that occurs when there is no space for bicyclists on board. 24
There may be bike-averse riders who have been driving their cars between San Francisco and 25 their Peninsula destinations; with rail service that brings riders "close enough" to their origins or 1 destinations, it is probable that a certain degree of mode-shift to Caltrain will occur. 2 3
In 2012, the PCJPB commissioned a feasibility study regarding blended Caltrain and 4 high-speed rail service. The study, performed by LTK Engineering, concluded that, while the 5 system is feasible, Caltrain service quality deteriorates quickly with the addition of one HSR 6 train to the line (see Figure 3) . Furthermore, Caltrain has, in the past, expressed a desire to run 7 up to 10 trains per hour on its line, but according to LTK, HSR would limit Caltrain to six trains 8 per hour (11). 9 10 11 FIGURE 4 Impact of Blended Service on the Peninsula. Caltrain headway range is defined 12 as the difference between maximum and minimum scheduled headways 13
14
Freight service still has a small, yet significant presence on the Peninsula Corridor. The ability of California HSR to attract business travelers and commuters will depend, 1 not only on its travel speed, but also its frequency. Ryan Westrom, in his 2014 thesis, finds that 2 "The combination of high-speed and appropriate frequency will result in a service that is most 3 advantageous, and thus competitive, for a trip of the right distance" (14) . For high-speed rail 4 service, much like the airline sector, frequency helps reduce schedule displacement between 5 trains. Schedule displacement is the perceived "wait time"; for example, a traveler that ideally 6 would depart at noon, but instead departs on a 12:45pm plane or train has a schedule 7 displacement of 45 minutes. Herein lies HSR's competitive advantage. Because the marginal 8 cost of adding rail service is much less than the marginal cost of an additional flight (rail's fixed 9 costs are higher than those of airlines), rail can support much higher frequencies than air even if 10 railcars are not as full (in general, rail can run profitably with a lower load factor, that is, percent 11 of seats occupied). Furthermore, in short-haul markets like California, frequency is more 12 important than it would be in long-haul markets because the ratio of passenger wait time to travel 13 time is much higher. mean that the operators will be competing both temporally and spatially at peak times for high-28 value infrastructure; a significant challenge from a capacity pricing and allocation perspective. 29 30 At the time of this writing, according to the authors' conversations with CHSRA, the TJPA 31 will retain ownership of the Transbay Transit Center and Downtown Railroad Extension (or the 32 private partner should the project proceed as a public-private partnership). This is essentially a 33 vertically separated railway system in which the infrastructure owner (the TJPA) is separate from 34 the railway operators (Caltrain and high-speed rail connections are a challenge for many riders. Secondly, Metrolink's schedules provide less 7 service frequency than Caltrain-its relatively minimal "reverse commute" service makes it an 8 unattractive service for commuters travelling away from downtown Los Angeles in the morning. 9
Finally, because Metrolink runs a majority of its trains on a network owned by freight railroads 10 (a significant portion of which is single-tracked), delays create reliability challenges. 11 12
As part of their new business plan in 2012, the CHSRA chose to pursue a blended system 13 in Southern California as well (2). As in Northern California, freight rail will remain on the 14 corridor. At the time of this writing, this blended system runs approximately 50 miles from 15
Burbank through to Los Angeles Union Station and on to Anaheim's newly-built Anaheim 16
Regional Transportation Intermodal Center (ARTIC) (2). Currently, electrification in Southern 17
California is solely for high-speed rail. This means that once a high-speed operator is running revenue service along with increased 10
Caltrain service, performing track construction to expand capacity on the line or in the Transbay 11
Transit Center will pose significant challenges. However, a renewed dedication to blended 12 operations is beginning to develop with the current discussion on Caltrain's new electric 13 equipment; CHSRA and Caltrain need to keep this momentum while moving towards a shared 14 system. 15 16
The phased approach at Burbank has system-wide consequences 17
The CHRSA's plan of terminating service at Burbank from 2022 to 2028 before extending 18 service to Anaheim and Los Angeles poses a risk. Transferring to conventional diesel service 19 from Burbank to Los Angeles and Anaheim will add a non-trivial amount of time in addition to a 20 perceived "transfer penalty" (See Table 2 ). There are also costs associated with operating a 21 temporary terminal station. Maintenance and baggage transfer facilities will be necessary, and 22 because a Burbank station has low transit connectivity, there is potential for transit-averse land-23 use patterns such as large parking structures. Furthermore, the relative lack of access from the 24 southern portion of the Los Angeles Basin might initially crimp ridership and revenue. Either a 25 private investor or the CHSRA (i.e. the State) itself will have to fund the cost of additional time 26
for ridership and revenue to materialize after completion of the section between Anaheim and 27 Los Angeles (planned for 2028). 28 29 Rail capacity in California is already a scarce asset and the blended approach of the CHSRA 27 demands that capacity be used even more carefully than today. A "buffet" approach to capacity 28 in which operators schedule services unilaterally, or even bilaterally, is infeasible. In order to 29 avoid a situation similar to that on the Northeast Corridor, with complex bilateral agreements 30 constraining a system-optimal timetable, California must devise a network-wide capacity 31 allocation mechanism. A top-down approach to service planning should dictate infrastructure 32 improvements to ensure quality system-wide performance for the commuter, interregional 33 traveler, high-speed passenger, and freight customer. Research that evaluated the feasibility and 34 likelihood of cooperation based on characteristics of each entity in California would be 35 beneficial as it would identify less-than-obvious institutional synergies. Currently, MIT's 36
Regional Transportation/High-speed Rail group is researching stakeholder analysis on the 37 Northeast Corridor. This research could be expanded into a broad evaluation tool for stakeholder 38 willingness to cooperate. Another potential avenue of research would look at how the Japanese 39 model could be exported to California. Unlike California, Japan's institutional structure is fully 40 integrated. Each of the four "JR" companies that operate high-speed service, operate commuter 41 rail service as well. Timed transfers are commonplace and on-time performance is high, and 42 operations on the system level are profitable. This would reduce the complexity of capacity 43 allocation as well as challenges associated with revenue sharing interlining and platform 44 compatibility. However, it would require local authorities to cede control to a state agency; 45 some politicians and constituents might be wary of this prospect. 46
1
The high-speed line from San Francisco to Los Angeles has a price tag of $68 billion. 2
The CHSRA's business model depends on over half of that money-$37 billion-coming from a 3 private operator bidding for a concession contract after the initial operating section from Merced 4 to Burbank operates profitably. To that end, a strong commuter rail network is essential for an 5 effective HSR network. One of the challenges with a blended system is passenger fare revenue 6
sharing, especially between a private operator and a public agency. For example, if Caltrain 7 transports a high-speed rail passenger who came from Fresno between San Jose and San 8 Francisco, what share of that total fare revenue should Caltrain receive? The degree of 9 complexity that the CHSRA is discussing in terms of interlining and through-ticketing does not 10 yet exist in the U.S. rail market. Airlines already practice some form of fare proration between 11 operators in offering code share flights, but this is between two private companies. Research that 12 identifies some of the institutional and regulatory challenges of cooperating with a private for-13 profit operator would be useful and valuable for both the CHSRA and its public agency partners. 14 Vehicle floor height compatibility and interline-ticketing can alleviate some capacity issues, but 15 most importantly, coordination is necessary to integrate operations on both a spatial and temporal 16 level. 17 18
Finally, the choice to use a blended approach stemmed from the fact that the CHSRA 19 faced a budget constraint. Should the current planned levels of rail capacity prove insufficient, 20 the California agencies, need to ensure a path for capacity improvements. A private investor will 21 demand that the voters of the state subsidize these risks. To this end, the CHSRA and local 22 commuter rail agencies should collectively plan for future capacity improvements including land 23 purchase and division of future capital expenditures. Capacity constraints at one end of the line 24 impact the performance of the entire California rail network. It is a classic systems issue, 25 balancing suboptimization and political and cost realities. 26 27 28
